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PARENTAL LEAVES OF ABSENCE FOR MEN
INTRODUCTION
As evidenced by the proposed Equal Rights Amendment,1 to-
day's society is increasingly aware of discrimination on the basis of
sex. While this new awareness often focuses on prejudice and dis-
crimination against women,2 men are also affected by sex stereo-
types and gender classifications. 3 As the language of Bradwell v.
Illinois4 illustrates, generalizations concerning women create ste-
reotypes about men:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits
it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the na-
ture of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs
to the domain and functions of womanhood. 5
This remark reflects traditional thinking about the "proper" roles
for both men and women. However, society has changed since
1872, and it is no longer assumed that men should protect and de-
fend women, that men are unsuited for the "domestic sphere," or
that women are unsuited for the "occupations of civil life." Such
arbitrary role-typing is unjustified for either sex.
In place of these arbitrary classifications there is a need to re-
think our instinctive reactions to all phases of traditional sexual
stereotyping. Just as women are entering careers that were once
considered to be appropriate only for men," men are now assuming
1. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST. proposed amend. XXVII.
2. See generally Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Con-
stitutional Amendment?, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 1499 (1971).
3. See Bear, Berger & Wright, Even Cowboys Sing the Blues: Difficulties Experienced
by Men Trying to Adopt Nontraditional Sex Roles and How Clinicians Can be Helpful to
Them, 5 SEx ROLES 191 (1979). "While the impact of the women's movement has made
therapists more sensitive to societal influences on the behavior of women, comparable atten-
tion has not been paid to societal influences on the sex-role stereotypical behavior or to the
price paid by men who violate stereotypical sex-role expectations." Id.
4. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
5. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
6. "The tutelary syndrome of Victorian days has yielded to a new era in which women
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roles, both in their choice of career" and in the home,8 that were
once considered to belong solely to women.
Among those activities once exclusively the "domain and func-
tions of womanhood" is the care of children. Courts have continu-
ally extolled the unique role of women in bearing and raising chil-
dren,10 thereby effectively denying men an equal opportunity to
raise their children. The conflict can be eliminated if legislators
and courts recognize a man's ability and desire to assume an equal
role in the family itself.
For men to take a more active part in child care, they will
often find it necessary to obtain leaves of absence from their jobs.
Assuming basic physical needs are met, either parent may regu-
larly care for a child. There is, therefore, no essential reason for
employers to premise parental leave benefits"11 on sexual stereo-
are contributing their talents in every field of endeavor-as prime ministers, governors, leg-
islators, judges, corporate executives, lawyers, scientists, medical doctors, police officers, and
professional athletes." Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.3d 608, 615, 601 P.2d 572, 577,
159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 345 (1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting), afl'd, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
7. "The goal of sex equality calls for not only an increase in the extent of women's
participation in the occupational system, but a more equitable distribution of men and wo-
men in all the occupations which comprise that system. This means more women doctors,
lawyers and scientists, more men social workers and school teachers." Rossi, Equality Be-
tween the Sexes: An Immodest Proposal, 93 DAEDALus 607, 638 (1964). See also Diaz v. Pan
Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (male plaintiff
applying for job as flight cabin attendant).
8. "The current ferment in Family Law is that virtually no tradition or precedent is
secure. There is a real conflict of interests .... The traditional prerogatives of husband and
father may now be regarded as historical anachronisms; everyone in the family is entitled to
do his (or her) thing; and like the members of the Swiss navy, they are all admirals." Foster
& Freed, Life With Father: 1978, in FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LovERS 139, 141 (S. Katz & M.
Inker eds. 1979). See also Bear, Berger & Wright, supra note 3.
9. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
10. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908):
[W]oman's physical structure and performance of maternal functions place her
at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence... [A]s healthy mothers are
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an ob-
ject of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race.
See also Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mont. Ct. App. 1938): "There is but a twilight
zone between a mother's love and the atmosphere of heaven."
11. Parental leave benefits are herein defined to include job security, preservation and
continuity of accrued seniority, eligibility for temporary disability compensation, and con-
tinued eligibility for group employment health and life insurance plans. See Comment,
Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 260,
at 264 n.22 (1972). While leave for childbirth might be considered to be a related benefit, it
is applicable only to women, and therefore will not be included in this discussion. Cf. Martin
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types, thus making them available to women but not to men.
This Comment will examine some of the reasons employers
might want to discriminate in their child care leave policies. It will
then discuss the implications of affording only women these privi-
leges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (in cases of
private employment), and under the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (in cases of govern-
ment employment). The analysis will focus upon two cases, Dan-
ielson v. Board of Higher Education12 and Ackerman v. Board of
Education of the City of New York, "3 both of which reflect much
needed changes that are gradually occurring in our society with re-
spect to attitudes and employment policies concerning child care
leaves.
I. RATIONALES FOR PAST DISCRIMINATION
In Orr v. Orr, 4 the Supreme Court stated that the fact that a
classification expressly discriminates against men rather than wo-
men does not protect it from scrutiny.1 5 The Court noted that in
order to be constitutionally permissible, classifications by gender
"must serve important governmental objectives, and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives."10 The Court
then examined possible objectives that might be served by Ala-
bama's statute making alimony available only to women.17 Simi-
larly, employers' objectives in making parental leaves of absence
available only to women must also be examined, in order to deter-
mine whether the gender classifications serve "important govern-
v. Dann, 9 EMPL. PRAC. SEC. (CCH) 10 (1975) (male plaintiff claimed he was "incapaci-
tated" by the pregnancy of his wife, because the Lamaze method of childbirth required his
presence at the birth; District Court dismissed the complaint which alleged that the Civil
Service Commission's limitation of pregnancy leave to females constituted sex discrimina-
tion and denial of his rights to equal protection).
12. 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
13. 372 F. Supp. 274, affl'd, 387 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
14. 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama alimony statute providing that husbands but not
wives may be required to pay alimony upon divorce held unconstitutional).
15. Id. at 279.
16. Id., citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977).
17. Id. These objectives included reinforcing the "State's preference for an allocation of
family responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependant role"; providing financial
assistance to wives of broken marriages; "using sex as a proxy for need"; and compensating
women for past discrimination during marriage, which effectively disabled them from sup-
porting themselves. Id. at 279-80.
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mental objectives" and are "substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.""8
One possible objective in restricting parental leave privileges
to women is administrative convenience. This argument involves
the notion that men are seldom willing to request or take a sub-
stantial amount of time from their jobs to care for a newborn child,
and that consequently employers need not engage in the adminis-
trative inconvenience of providing parental leaves of absence to
both their male and female employees. However, this rationale will
not justify sex-based discrimination under the United States Con-
stitution,1 since "the Constitution recognizes higher values than
speed and efficiency. '20 In Stanley v. Illinois,21 the Supreme Court
asserted:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individual-
ised determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determi-
native issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present real-
ities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod
over the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot
stand.2"
The Court concluded that all Illinois parents, including unwed fa-
thers, were entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their chil-
dren were summarily removed from their custody.23 In Orr the Su-
preme Court also ruled that an administrative convenience
rationale was not sufficient to justify generalizations about one sex
or the other when deciding whether or not to grant alimony bene-
fits. 24 The Court reasoned that even if the alimony statute con-
served some administrative time and effort, it would not justify "a
mandatory preference to members of either sex"25 under the Con-
stitution. Similarly, this rationale should not be used to justify
generalizations about either sex where parental leaves are con-
18. Id., citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977).
19. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
20. Id. at 656.
21. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
22. Id. at 656-57. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), in which the Supreme
Court ruled that to give "mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of
the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
23. 405 U.S. at 658.
24. 440 U.S. at 281.
25. Id. at 282 n.12.
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cerned. The procedure of automatically granting parental leaves
only to women infringes upon the vital interests of fathers in their
children's upbringing.
A second argument for such gender classifications involves the
presumption that women are generally better suited than men to
care for very young children. This concept is commonly referred to
as the "tender years presumption. '26 It was originally formulated
by the family courts as a basis for summarily awarding custody of
minor children to the mother after the parents were divorced. 7
The validity of the "tender years presumption," is now gener-
ally considered to be archaic and stereotypical, and therefore, is no
longer widely recognized.28 Consequently, other policies based
upon similar presumptions should also be considered suspect.
When applied to employment policies on parental leaves, a pre-
sumption that the woman is best suited to care for the child does
not allow parents to decide for themselves who should remain
home and assume primary responsibility for raising their children.
Another rationale for the discrimination is developed from the
theory that male employees are indispensable to their employers,
and that any absence from their positions, even for a short period
of time, would compound the administrative and financial
problems of finding and training suitable replacements. Tradition-
ally, men have held positions requiring more education, training,
and experience than women, and consequently, employers have
found their male employees more expensive and difficult to
replace.
26. See State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 180, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287 (N.Y.
Cty. Faro. Ct. 1973), where the court stated that the "tender years presumption" is really a
court's statement that, until proven otherwise, mothers are always better suited to care for
young children than fathers.
27. See generally Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1333-38 (1980).
28. State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc.2d at 180-81, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 288-89.
[T]he trend in legislation, legal commentary, and judicial decisions is away from
the "tender years presumption" . . . . [It] should be discarded because it is
based on outdated social stereotypes rather than on rational and up-to-date con-
sideration of the welfare of the children involved. . . . [It is] out of touch with
contemporary thought about child development and male and female
stereotypes.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Podell, Peck & First, Custody-to Which Parent?, 56 MARQ.
L. REv. 51, 56 n.23 (1972), which analyzes recent child custody cases from twenty-six differ-
ent states. In these cases, the respective courts treated the parents equally and considered
the child's best interests, and the father prevailed.
1982]
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* This problem, however, becomes less and less valid for sex-
based discrimination where parental leaves of absence are con-
cerned, since women are increasingly assuming positions which
present similarly serious administrative problems when they take
time off for child care. As with many previous gender-based em-
ployment policies, 29 the rationales of impossibility and excessive
expense cannot withstand scrutiny. Just as employers are able to
cope with gender-neutral sick leaves, they are capable of coping
with parental leaves for both sexes.
A final argument is connected to a "preference for an alloca-
tion of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a depen-
dent role."30 The Supreme Court in Orr v. Orr31 also analyzed this
objective, and found that this basis could not protect the gender-
based alimony statute from constitutional attack. Similarly, any
preference for the wife remaining at home to care for the children,
even if still existent in our society, could not support a gender-
based parental leave policy.32
In Stanton v. Stanton,33 the Supreme Court ruled that the old
notion of the man as provider cannot justify discrimination on the
basis of sex, since "[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the
home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the mar-
ketplace and the world of ideas. '84 In Califano v. Goldfarb,5 Mr.
Justice Stevens, in concurring that arbitrary assumptions about
men and women will not suffice to justify gender-based discrimina-
tion in the distribution of employment benefits, remarked that the
"discrimination against a group of males is merely the accidental
byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females."3 In-
deed, classifications which distribute benefits on the basis of gen-
der inherently risk reinforcing stereotypical ideas about "the
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection. 3 7
Such rationales and presumptions concerning the proper roles and
29. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Board of Educ., 372 F. Supp. 274 (1974), affd, 387 F. Supp.
76 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Danielson v. Board of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
30. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 279.
31. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
32. See id. at 279-80.
33. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
34. Id. at 14-15.
35. 430 U.S. 199 (1976).
36. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring).
37. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 283.
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preferences of both men and women must be scrutinized under
both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the United
States Constitution.
II. TiTE VII OF THE CivIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin.-3 It governs any alleged discrimination in private employ-
ment.3 9 The Act was originally intended to prohibit discrimination
by employers against blacks and, when it was first introduced to
the House Rules Committee, it contained no prohibition of sex dis-
crimination.40 Congressman Smith proposed amending the equal
employment section of the Act, Title VII, to include a proscription
against sex discrimination, since "sex discrimination in industry
was a serious problem."4' In support of the amendment, Congress-
woman Kelly declared: "In this amendment we seek equal oppor-
tunity in employment for women. No more-no less. '42 The
amendment passed by a comfortable margin.4
In order for women to attain the equal opportunity in employ-
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) entitled "Unlawful employment practices," states:
(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employ-
ees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
39. [T]he coverage of Title VII is not as broad as one might wish. The Act does
not cover private employers, unions, or employment agencies with twenty-four
employees or less. It also exempts the federal government, corporations owned
by the U.S. government, state and local governments, bona fide membership
clubs, religious and educational institutions, and Indian tribes. . . . Further-
more, the designation of the EEOC as "enforcement agency" of Title VII is de-
ceptive. The Commission has no enforcement powers. It handles charges through
investigation and conciliation.
Comment, supra note 11, at 270 n.57.
40. The bill, H.R. 7152, was first introduced by Congressman Celler in June, 1963.
Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DuKE L.J. 671, 676 (1968).
41. Id.
42. 110 CONG. REc. 2583 (1964).
43. It passed 168 in favor, 133 opposed. Note, supra note 40, at 676:77.
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ment which the legislators intended, they must be afforded the op-
tions necessary to pursue these employment opportunities. Such
options include the freedom to decide who should work and who
should remain home. An employment policy which provides paren-
tal leaves of absence only to women effectively discriminates
against women in their pursuit of careers and employment oppor-
tunities, since they are in effect being told that their proper place
is in the home with the children." Furthermore, since the terms of
the statute are gender-neutral, it is intended to ensure equal op-
portunity and benefits in employment for both men and women.
Therefore, such a gender-based employment policy clearly discrim-
inates against men and women in their "terms, conditions or privi-
leges of employment"'45 within the meaning of Title VII.
In Ackerman v. Board of Education of the City of New
York,'6 the plaintiff Ackerman alleged a violation of Title VII
when his application for a leave of absence without pay for pur-
poses of child care was denied by the New York City Board of Ed-
ucation. 47 Ackerman was informed that under the By-Laws of the
Board of Education, "the leave was available only to the Board of
Education's female employees. '48 When Ackerman took a "mater-
nity leave" anyway, the school board considered it to be a de facto
resignation. Although Ackerman's suit raised the possibility of a
Title VII violation, there was no final adjudication of the issue,
since Ackerman's teaching license was terminated for other rea-
sons. The Court believed its choice of remedies was therefore sig-
nificantly narrowed. It now could not prevent the New York City
Board of Education from either discharging Ackerman as a
teacher, or denying him the requested leave of absence for child
care. e Furthermore, the by-law in issue was subsequently amended
to provide parental leaves "to a natural or adoptive parent upon
44. See Comment, supra note 11, at 286: "Many courts, employers, legal experts, and
legislators doggedly insist that a woman's place is in the home (footnote omitted). For the
females who have strayed outside this domain into the labor force, pregnancy becomes an
excuse to send them back where they belong and keep them there."
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1976).
46. 372 F. Supp. 274 (1974), afl'd, 387 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
47. The applicable part of § 107 of the By-Laws of the Board of Education provided:
"As soon as any regular or non-regular employee in the teaching staff shall become aware of
her pregnancy, she shall apply for a leave of absence for the purpose of maternity and child
care." 372 F. Supp. at 276, 387 F. Supp. at 78 (emphasis added).
48. 372 F. Supp. at 276.
49. Id. at 277.
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application."50 Thus, Ackerman's action for declaratory and mone-
tary relief had effectively been mooted, and the Court never had to
deal with the issue of whether the gender-based policy violated Ti-
tle VII.
Significantly, Title VII does not require that an employer offer
parental leave benefits to employees. The fact that an employer's
benefits do not include parental leaves does not, therefore, create
any type of gender-based discrimination. 51 However, when an em-
ployer does offer these benefits, both men and women must be eli-
gible to receive them, since Title VII prohibits "arbitrary distinc-
tions between mothers and fathers. ' 52 As with health care and
other medically related benefits, parental leaves must be made
available to both male and female employees.
53
50. Id.
51. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
the exclusion of pregnancy from the disabilities covered by an employment benefits plan
does not violate Title VII. The Court reasoned that "gender-based discrimination does not
result simply because an employer's disability-benefits plan is less than all-inclusive" and
that "pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the
failure to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the bene-
fits, accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion
at risks." Id. at 138-39 (emphasis in original). In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978, which effectively reversed the Supreme Court's narrow interpreta-
tion of Title VII in Gilbert. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). The Act amended
Title VII to require employers to provide the same coverage of pregnancy under their health
care plans as they provide for any other temporary medical disability, since sex discrimina-
tion unmistakably includes discrimination based on pregnancy. The Report of the House
Committee on Education and Labor indicated that
the assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the labor force leads
to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the discrimina-
tory practices which keep women in low-paying and dead-end jobs. H.R. 6075
unmistakably reaffirms that sex discrimination includes discrimination based on
pregnancy, and specifically defines standards which require that pregnant work-
ers be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inabil-
ity to work.
H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4749, 4751. Under this Act, employers must now provide the same coverage of pregnancy
under their health care plans as they provide for any other temporary medical disability.
52. See Larson, Sex Discrimination as to Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKE L. J. 805, 847
(1975). See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 334 n.112
(1979).
53. The issue of parental leaves can be distinguished from the issues in Stroud v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1977). In Stroud, a female plaintiff alleged a violation
of Title VII because Delta Air Lines refused to hire any married women as flight attendants.
However, since only women held these positions, the court determined that the no-marriage
rule discriminated on the basis of marriage rather than sex. No sex discrimination therefore
existed, and Title VII did not apply. Conversely, the discrimination concerning parental
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
III. BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ)
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes an exception to
its general rule of prohibiting sex discrimination in employment.
The statute specifically allows sex discrimination in hiring that can
be justified "in those certain instances where religion, sex, or na-
tional origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise."'" By adding this "bona fide occupational qualification"
(bfoq) clause, Congress acknowledged that inherent physical and
cultural differences between men and women would sometimes ne-
cessitate different hiring patterns on the basis of sex.55 Since hiring
patterns sometimes need to be different, there might be some cases
in which the employment benefits need to be different as well.
However, child care leave benefits are not within this category.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission56 has promul-
gated rules to interpret the bfoq exception,57 and it has stated that
the bfoq should be narrowly construed,5 so that sexual character-
istics, rather than characteristics which correlate with one sex or
another, are the basis for the bona fide occupational qualification
exception.59 Therefore, the fact that an employer may correlate
child care with the female sex will not sustain, under the bfoq ex-
ception, the distribution of child care benefits only to female
employees.
Clearly, the bfoq is not a license for employers to re-establish
leaves is based solely on sex. If women with young children are permitted to take parental
leaves of absence, while men with young children are not so permitted, the resulting sex-
based discrimination is obvious.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
55. Examples of such inherent differences include an elderly woman desiring the ser-
vices of a female nurse, an all-male baseball team, and a masseur. The exception also applies
where the specific physical characteristics of one sex or the other are needed for the purpose
of genuineness or authenticity, such as in the employment of actors, actresses, and fashion
models. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1971) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). See also Comment, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 H~av. L. REV. 1109, 1176 (1971); Comment, supra note 11, at 267 n.42
("While there are jobs for which the sex of an employee is so essential that no member of
the opposite sex could do them, they are few in number.").
56. Hereinafter cited as "EEOC."
57. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1, 1604.2
(1981).
58. 29 C.F.R. §1604.2(a) (1981); accord, Comment, supra note 55.
59. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
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forbidden sex-based generalizations. In Phillips v. Martin Mari-
etta Corporation,0 the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
misinterpreted the meaning of the bfoq clause. The Court ruled
that an employer may not refuse to hire women with pre-school
age children if the employer is hiring men with pre-school age chil-
dren. However, it went on to remark that the "existence of such
conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job
performance for a woman than a man, could arguably be a basis
for distinction under § 703(e) of the Act" and that it is a "matter
of evidence tending to show that the condition in question 'is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.'"" This
remark implies that if just about all women with young children
were unable to perform efficiently at work, then such a policy
would be valid under the bfoq exception.2
In his concurring opinion in Phillips, Mr. Justice Marshall
pointed out that the bfoq clause was not intended to "swallow the
rule" about sex discrimination." It should not promulgate general-
izations about the characteristics of women as a class, nor should it
support views about those practices which are more common to
women, as being legitimate bases for such discrimination. He con-
cluded that when "performance characteristics of an individual are
involved, even when parental .roles are concerned, employment
opportunity may be limited only by employment criteria that are
neutral as to the sex of the applicant."" The "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" was not intended by Congress to permit "an-
cient canards about the proper role of women to be a basis for sex
discrimination."6 Therefore, the assumption that most women
take principal responsibility in caring for pre-school age children
does not merit discriminating against all women with pre-school
age children under the bfoq exception. Logically, then, the infer-
ence that most men with pre-school age children do not assume
such responsibility does not justify denying them parental
privileges.
60. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 544.
62. See Comment, supra note 55, at 1178 n.61.
63. 400 U.S. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 545, 547 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 545.
1982]
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There has been some debate as to whether Congress intended
the bfoq defense to apply only to the initial hiring process, and not
to the conditions, privileges, and terms of employment:
It is arguable that the bfoq exception is applicable solely to the initial
hiring process. The exception provision, section 703(e), states that it is not
unlawful to "hire and employ" on the basis of sex, where sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification, but no explicit mention is made of terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment .... One might conclude that the limited
reference to hiring was deliberate, and that Congress did not intend applica-
tion of a bfoq defense to a charge of discrimination in the terms of
employment.8
The EEOC, on the other hand, has seemed to accord a broader
scope to the bfoq exception and has claimed, as an example, that
an employer's suspension of a female employee going into her sev-
enth month of pregnancy might in some cases be justified as a
bfoq, but only if the employer could prove that virtually all women
could not perform safely and effectively in this condition. 7 In or-
der to utilize the bfoq exception in this situation, the employer
would have an extremely heavy burden of proving a factual basis
for believing that most pregnant women cannot perform their jobs
well." Nevertheless, when applying the bfoq exception to the
terms and conditions of employment, the benefit of parental leaves
could never qualify as a bfoq, since there is no reason why men
cannot perform the duties of child care as aptly as do women.
The regulations of the EEOC s provide that the bfoq excep-
66. Comment, supra note 11, at 265. See also Larson, supra note 52, at 848 (the bona
fide occupational qualification applies only to discrimination in the act of hiring, not to the
"terms, conditions, and privileges" of employment).
67. Comment, supra note 11, at 265, 267; see also Comment, supra note 55, at 1176
n.46.
68. Comment, supra note 11, at 265-67.
69. The regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1981) provide in pertinent part:
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification ex-
ception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Label-"Men's jobs" and "Wo-
men's jobs"-tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex
or the other. (1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not
warrant the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception: (i)
The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the
comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For example, the
assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than among men. (ii)
The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable of assem-
bling intricate equipment and that women are less capable of aggressive sales-
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tion may not be applied to refuse to hire an individual based on
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. 70 Extending this stan-
dard to the conditions and privileges of employment,7 1 neither
does the bfoq exception justify allocating job related benefits on
the basis of stereotypes and commonly accepted characterizations
about either sex. Just as an airline cannot require female cabin at-
tendants who become mothers to resign or change to ground duty
positions, while not imposing such restrictions on their male coun-
terparts who become fathers, 2 they cannot deny fathers leave time
for child care while at the same time offering it to mothers.
Clearly, prohibition of sex discrimination in employment is in-
tended to eliminate the "entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. 7 3
The EEOC's regulations also provide that the bfoq may not be
applied to refuse to hire a woman based on her sex, on account of
"assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of
women in general. ' 74 Consequently, an employer may not refuse to
manship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be consid-
ered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any
characteristics generally attributed to the group. . . . (2) Where it is necessary
for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will consider sex
to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress.
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1981). A company may not refuse to hire women on the
premise that women are the "weaker sex" and not physically qualified for the heavy lifting
and vigorous work involved. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir.
1971). Similarly, an airline may not refuse to hire men as flight attendants simply because
women have a reputation for being more adept than men at reassuring anxious passengers
and attending to their "psychological" needs. Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d
385, 387 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). See also Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969):
Title VII rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and
instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take
on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the
incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, bor-
ing or unromantic tasks is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that
women are now to be on an equal footing. We cannot conclude that by including
the bona fide occupational qualification exception Congress intended to renege
on that promise.
Id. at 236.
71. See Comment, supra note 11, at 266.
72. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th
Cir. 1978), rev'd in part, 102 S.Ct. 1127 (1982).
73. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (emphasis
added).
74. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1) (1981).
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offer the same privileges of employment to both men and women
on the basis of general predictions about the class as a whole, even
if it is possible to prove that those predictions or generalizations
are usually true. For example, an employer cannot require female
employees to pay larger contributions to a pension plan on the ba-
sis that women as a class tend to live longer than men, and there-
fore are likely to receive the same retirement benefits for a longer
period of time than their male co-workers. In City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,75 the Supreme
Court ruled that such a generalization is not a valid basis for
discrimination:
An employment practice that requires 2,000 individuals to contribute
more money into a fund than 10,000 other employees simply because each of
them is a woman, rather than a man, is in direct conflict with both the lan-
guage and the policy of the Act. Such a practice does not pass the simple test
of whether the evidence shows "treatment of a person in a manner which but
for that person's sex would be different." 6
Accordingly, each employee must be treated on an individual basis,
rather than on the basis of characteristics generally attributed to
the entire group.
The issue of parental leaves is analogous to the policy at issue
in Manhart. An employment policy that denies parental leaves of
absence to an entire class of employees, simply because they are
men rather than women, is also in "direct conflict with both the
language and the policy" of Title VII. Even if the generalization
(that most women take care of children and most men do not) can
be proven to be true, parental leave privileges cannot be arbitrarily
determined on this basis.
Attributes which are culturally more prevalent among one sex
than the other therefore cannot be used to justify sex discrimina-
tion,7 8 and will not support a bona fide occupational qualification
exception. The stereotype of the woman as the full-time mother
and homemaker cannot be used as a basis for denying women
equal employment opportunity,79 nor for denying men equal em-
75. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
76. Id. at 711 (footnote omitted).
77. Id.
78. In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1146
(7th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part, 102 S.Ct. 1127 (1982).
79. "[F]reedom to be a mother should not include the larger role of housewife, a role
commonly associated with motherhood, but not essential to basic female identity." Note,
[Vol. 31286
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ployment privileges, such as the privilege of parental leaves.80
None of these theories can therefore be advanced by employers as
reasons for denying parental leaves of absence to male employees
in any situation where such leaves are provided for female
employees.
IV. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
While Title VII governs any alleged discrimination with re-
spect to private employment,81 the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 2 applies to government employment
(federal, state, or local), or to any function in which the state is
significantly involved. 3
The Supreme Court has repeatedly demonstrated its commit-
ment to the maintenance of family relationships.8 Although family
law issues are usually regulated by the states, 5 the Supreme Court
will sometimes intervene on constitutional grounds when there is
the possibility that state statutes will diminish the vitality of the
family relationship. 8
supra note 40, at 693.
80. Moreover, customer preferences and increased costs do not justify discriminatory
treatment under the bfoq exception. See Larson, supra note 52, at 848; Comment, supra
note 11, at 266; Comment, supra note 55, at 1174, 1176-77.
81. See supra note 39.
82. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
83. In order for the Fourteenth Amendment to apply, there must be some governmen-
tal involvement. The "Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful." Shelley v: Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). "[Plrivate conduct
abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some
significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have become
involved in it." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). See also
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1085, 1121 (1960): "The
principle that the State and not the private individual is the addressee of the fourteenth
amendment continues to be the law today .... Only those 'private' interests that have
been involved in a governmental function or have exercised extraordinary powers under law
have been identified with the state."
84. Comment, The Doctrine of Family Integrity: Protecting the Parental Rights of
Unwed Fathers Who Have Substantial Relationships With Their Children, 13 CONN. L.
REV. 145, 145 (1980).
85. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
86. Comment, supra note 84, at 145-46 & n.4.
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A. Due-Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property"
without due process of law.87 The freedom to raise one's children
in the manner one chooses has been established as a liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause.8  The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that parents have a constitutional right to be primarily re-
sponsible for the care and upbringing of their children and that,
before this right can be interfered with, the government must show
a rational basis for policies that abridge or interfere with this
right.
8 9
The Supreme Court first acknowledged this parental right in
Meyer v. Nebraska"0 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.9 1 In both
cases the Supreme Court invalidated state laws imposing limita-
tions on the ability of parents to control their children's educa-
tion.9 2 In doing so, the Court recognized that statutes mandating
certain means of raising children unconstitutionally infringed upon
the liberty of the individual to "establish a home and bring up
children," '93 and to "direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren under their control. '94 The Court asserted that these rights
"may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable rela-
tion to some purpose within the competency of the state" and that
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state.
9 5
These constitutional principles are relevant to the issue of pa-
rental leaves. Just as the state may not dictate how a child is to be
87. See supra note 82.
88. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."); Doe
v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1167 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980) ("The Supreme
Court has long recognized the right of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their
children as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
89. See Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections on and Beyond the
Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv. 459, 488 (1982).
90. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
91. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
92. The statute in Meyer prohibited the teaching in any school, whether public or pri-
vate, of any subject in a language other than English. The challenged law in Pierce required
that all children between the ages of eight and sixteen years be educated in a public school.
93. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399.
94. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
95. Id. at 535.
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educated, it cannot formulate policies that have the effect of deter-
mining which parent will stay home during a child's formative
years. When state or federal government employers arbitrarily de-
cide which of their employees will receive parental leave benefits,
they are effectively deciding this and, in the process, are deciding a
matter which only the parents have the right and duty to decide.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,96 a school board
policy requiring pregnant school teachers to take unpaid maternity
leaves of absence five months before the expected date of child-
birth, and return to work not earlier than the beginning of the next
full semester after the child reached the age of three months, was
found to violate the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court
ruled that the Cleveland School Board's policies impermissibly em-
ployed "irrebuttable presumptions" '98 about pregnancy, thereby pe-
nalizing a pregnant school teacher for her decision to bear a child.
The Court acknowledged that the freedom of family life is one of
the "basic civil rights of man '99 and, therefore, protected by the
Due Process Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that a
rule such as this one "not needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously
impinge upon this vital area of a teacher's constitutional lib-
erty."100 Just as overly restrictive maternity leave policies penalize
women for their decision to bear and raise children, limited paren-
tal leave policies that pertain only to women penalize men for their
decision to stay at home to raise their children. Under the Due
Process Clause, one has a right to be free from governmental inter-
96. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
97. Rule No. 72-777 of the Cleveland School Board, reproduced in 414 U.S. 635 n.1
provided as follows:
Any married teacher who becomes pregnant and who desires to return to the
employ of the Board at a future date may be granted a maternity leave of ab-
sence without pay. APPLICATION A maternity leave of absence shall be effec-
tive not less than five (5) months before the expected date of the normal birth
of the child. Application for such leave shall be forwarded to the Superintendent
at least two (2) weeks before the effective date of the leave of absence. A leave
of absence without pay shall be granted by the Superintendent for a period not
to exceed two (2) years. REASSIGNMENT A teacher may return to service
from maternity leaves not earlier than the beginning of the regular school se-
mester which follows the child's age of three (3) months. A teacher's failure to
follow the above rules for maternity leave of absence shall be construed as ter-
mination of contract or as grounds for dismissal. (Emphasis in original).
98. 414 U.S. at 648.
99. Id. at 640 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
100. Id. at 640.
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ference in -the decision to have children and to raise a family.10'
One also has the same right to be free from such intrusion into the
matters of how and by whom that child will be raised.102
The rights of all fathers to have input into how their natural
children are raised were explicitly recognized by the Supreme
Court in Stanley v. Illinois.103 The petitioner Stanley challenged
the Illinois statutory scheme which mandated that children of un-
wed parents became wards of the state upon the death of the
mother. Although a hearing on parental fitness was required before
all mothers and previously married fathers could be deprived of
their children, no such hearing was required for unwed fathers.
Unwed fathers were therefore presumed to be unfit to raise their
children, whereas all other parents were given the benefit of
parental fitness. When the mother died, Stanley's children were
taken from him and placed with court-appointed guardians. There
was never any sort of hearing on his fitness, nor any proof of pa-
rental neglect. Stanley consequently claimed a violation of his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.104
The -Supreme Court ruled that as a matter of due process,
Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness before being de-
prived of the custody of his children. The Court emphasized that
"[tihe private interest here, that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a pow-
erful countervailing interest, protection." 05 Because of the magni-
101. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
102. See, e.g., Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1167 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829
(1980) where the court stated:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for ob-
ligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. . . .And it is in recognition of
this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter . . .. The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their chil-
dren is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.
See also Keiter, supra note 89, at 488-94.
103. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
104. Id. at 647.
105. Id. at 651. See'also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d. Cir. 1977): "It is
the interest of the parent in the 'companionship, care, custody and management of his or
her children,' . . . and of the children in not being dislocated from the 'emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association,' with the parent ... " [citations
omitted].
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tude of the interest involved, the state may not presume that all
unwed fathers are unfit to raise their children "solely because it is
more convenient to presume than to prove." 108
In this case, the Supreme Court has clearly demonstrated its
definitive position on the rights of natural fathers. The interests of
all natural fathers in their children merit "deference" and "protec-
tion. 1 107 The logical implication of this reasoning is that a father's
rights to parental leaves should not be restricted solely on the ba-
sis of sex. To deny parental leaves to men effectively abridges their
fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children.
B. Equal Protection
In order to be permissible under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, °10  a classification "must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." 0 9 Using this standard, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
struck down statutes which arbitrarily discriminated on the basis
of sex.110 Employment policies which provide parental leave privi-
leges only to women 1 should be struck down for the same reason.
In Orr v. Orr112 the Supreme Court ruled that Alabama's gen-
der-based alimony statute, which made alimony available to wo-
106. 405 U.S. at 658.
107. Id. at 651.
108. See supra note 82.
109. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
110. In Reed, 404 U.S. at 76, 77, the Supreme Court ruled that an Idaho statute which
gave automatic preference to men over women in the same entitlement class for appoint-
ment as administrators of decedents' estates was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
In Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), a Utah statute mandating different ages of major-
ity for men and women (resulting in the appellee's obligation to support his son to the age
of 21, but his daughter only to the age of 18) was held to be unconstitutional for the same
reason. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977), the Su-
preme Court decided that Oklahoma's statute, prohibiting the sale of 3.2% alcohol content
beer to men under the age of 21, and to women under the age of 18, was not substantially
related to the state's objective of reducing drunk driving and the number of traffic
accidents.
111. See, e.g., infra note 122 (maternity leave policy of Board of Higher Education in
Danielson v. Board of Higher Educ., 358 F.Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
112. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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men but not to men, was unconstitutional. 1 3 The Court stated
that the gender distinction involved was gratuitous and tended to
reinforce stereotypical ideas about "the 'proper place' of women
and their need for special protection. 11 4 Similarly, an employment
policy based on sexual stereotyping is merely a reflection of stere-
otypical ideas. Men should no more be automatically ineligible for
parental leaves of absence than for receipt of alimony or support
payments.
In the recent case of Caban v. Mohammed,""5 the appellant
Caban challenged the constitutionality of section 111 of New
York's Domestic Relations Law. This statute permitted an unwed
mother to block the adoption of her child simply by withholding
consent. The unwed father, on the other hand, could prevent the
adoption only be demonstrating that the adoption would not be
within the child's best interests."" Caban's two natural children
were adopted by their mother (with whom Caban had lived for five
years) and her husband, thereby resulting in the termination of
Caban's parental rights.1 17 His own petition for adoption was de-
nied because the mother had withheld her consent. Caban con-
tended that the distinction drawn by the statute between unwed
113. ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (1975) provided in pertinent part that if "the wife has no
separate estate or if it be insufficient for her maintenance, the judge, upon granting a di-
vorce, at his discretion, may order to the wife an allowance out of the estate of the husband,
taking into consideration the value thereof and the condition of his family." 440 U.S. at 270
n.1. In Davis v. Davis, 279 Ala. 643, 644, 189 So.2d 158, 160 (1966), the Alabama Supreme
Court declared that "there is no authority in this state for awarding alimony against the
wife in favor of the husband.. . . The statutory scheme is to provide alimony only in
favor of the wife." Id. at 270 n.1. The statute has been amended to conform with the Court's
decision. ALA. CODE §30-2-51 (1981).
114. 440 U.S. at 283.
115. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
116. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §111 (McKinney 1977) provided in part that "consent to
adoption shall be required as follows: . . .(b) Of the parents or surviving parent, whether
adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the mother, whether adult or infant,
of a child born out of wedlock. "441 U.S. at 385. Absent abandonment, relinquishment
of rights, or parental incompetence (in which cases parental consent for adoption is unnec-
essary), an unwed mother had the authority under this law to block the adoption of her
child by withholding consent. An unwed father had no similar powers, even when his rela-
tionship with his child had been substantial. Id. at 385-87. The statute has been amended to
conform with the Court's decision. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1980).
117. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1977) provided that "[a]fter the making of
an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of all paren-
tal duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have no rights over such adoptive
child or to his property by descent or succession, except as hereinafter stated." 441 U.S. at
384 n.2.
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fathers and all other parents violated his rights to equal protection.
The Supreme Court found the statute to be another example
of an overly broad generalization. The disparate treatment of un-
wed mothers and unwed fathers bore no relationship to the state's
purported interest in promoting the adoption of illegitimate chil-
dren. The Court declared that the effect of the statute was to dis-
criminate impermissibly against unwed fathers even when their
identity was known, and when they had demonstrated a significant
parental interest.11 The Court thereby concluded that the differ-
ent treatment of unwed mothers and unwed fathers concerning the
adoption of their children was not shown to be substantially re-
lated to an important state interest and therefore violated the
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 9
Similarly, a state's different treatment of mothers and fathers in
the conferral of parental leave benefits would also violate the equal
protection of the laws, since it is not substantially related to any
important interest.1 20
V. THE PRESENT LAW
Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the United
States Constitution require that men and women be treated
equally, and be afforded equal treatment and privileges in employ-
ment. Leave for child care is one such benefit which must be
equally distributed to all employees. If child care privileges are
118. The Court stated:
The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed fathers as
being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned
judgment as to the fate of their children. Section 111 both excludes some loving
fathers from full participation in the decision whether their children will be
adopted and, at the same time, enables some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut
off the paternal rights of fathers.
441 U.S. at 394.
119. Id. at 382, 394.
120. In addition to invalidating discriminatory state laws, the Supreme Court has also
struck down on equal protection grounds federal statutes which provided for dissimilar
treatment of men and women. By so doing, the Court has affirmed that generalizations
about traditional family structure are not sufficient to sustain statutes based solely upon
gender. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (spouses of both male and
female members of the uniformed services held eligible for support benefits); Califano v.
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979), aff'd on reh'g, 443 U.S. 901 (1979) (unemployment benefits for
needy families with dependent children apply where either the mother or father is unem-
ployed); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (widows and widowers of deceased
workers held eligible for survivors' benefits).
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made available to women employees, but not to men employees,
the effect is discriminatory to women as well as men, since such a
policy restricts a woman's choice to either staying home from work
to care for the child, or incurring expenses for assistance from
third parties.
This is the problem which the plaintiffs in Danielson v. Board
of Higher Education'21 faced. In that case, Ross Danielson, a lec-
turer of sociology at City College, City University of New York,
and his wife Susan, a lecturer at Lehman College, another branch
of the City University of New York, challenged on equal protection
grounds the constitutionality of the University's maternity leave
policy, which was reserved exclusively for women. 122 When Susan
became pregnant in 1970, the couple carefully considered their al-
ternatives. They decided that she would retain her teaching posi-
tion while he remained at home and assumed principal responsibil-
ity for the care of their newborn child.2 3 Accordingly, Ross
Danielson applied for a "parental leave of absence.' 1 24 This re-
quest was either denied or ignored. 25 Danielson took a leave of
121. 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
122. At the time of the lawsuit, Article XIII, Section 13.4 of the By-Laws of the Board
of Higher Education provided in pertinent part:
Maternity Leave. a. As soon as a member of the instructional staff shall become
aware of her pregnancy, she shall forthwith notify the president and may apply
for a leave of absence. Such leave shall begin on February 1 or September 1,
unless the conditions of the pregnancy require that the leave begin sooner. The
duration of the leave shall be at least one full semester .... An extension of
maternity leave shall be permitted on request for a period not in excess of one
year from the end of the original leave. No further extentions [sic] shall be
permitted.
b. Maternity leaves shall be granted without pay during the period of the leave,
including the vacation period concomitant to the leave ....
358 F.Supp. at 24-25 (emphasis added). The parties agreed that this provision did not com-
pel women to take maternity leave. Id. at 25.
123. 358 F. Supp. at 24.
124. Id. The request was in the form of different letters to the Acting Chairman of the
Department, the President of City College, the Chancellor of the City University of New
York, and the Chairman of the Board of Higher Education.
125. The Acting Chairman of the Department rejected the requested leave, stating that
no leave of absence for any reason could be provided for persons without tenure (but see
Brief for Defendants at 18, Danielson v. Board of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), wherein defendants assert that "Ross Danielson might have obtained a leave for spe-
cial purposes under Section 13.6 if he so requested, for the purpose of taking care of his
child." This section provided for special leaves for personal emergencies for a maximum of
10 days with pay at the President's discretion. 358 F. Supp. at 27). The Acting Chairman
warned Danielson that his letter would be considered to be a resignation as of January 31,
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absence in the spring semester of 1971 to undertake his child care
obligations, at which time his superiors considered his action to be
tantamount to a resignation. Although Danielson was later rehired,
the computation of his continuous service time that is required to
be considered for tenure was adversely affected. Danielson brought
suit, claiming that the Board's maternity leave policy discrimi-
nated against him on account of his sex, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He asserted that
"[t]here can be no equal rights for women without equal rights for
men."
1 26
The District Court for the Southern District of New York de-
nied the defendant Board's motion to dismiss, deciding that Dan-
ielson had presented at least a "colorable constitutional claim."
127
However, the court never adjudicated Danielson's claim because
the Board of Higher Education subsequently changed its policy to
make leaves of absence -available to both men and women.
128
So far, only one other reported case, Ackerman v. Board of
Education of the City of New York,L29 has directly addressed this
issue. In that case the District Court for the Southern District of
New York also never adjudicated the plaintiff's claim of discrimi-
1971. The President of City College, along with his Review Committee, rejected Danielson's
request without offering a reason. Danielson's subsequent appeals to the Chancellor of the
University and the Chairman of the Board of Higher Education were ignored. 358 F. Supp.
at 25.
126. Letter of November 10, 1970 to the President of City College, quoted in Danielson
v. Board of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. at 25. The letter further stated: "If not granted a
leave of absence, a husband who wishes to care for a young infant must suffer greater hard-
ship (such as termination of employment and loss, even with reappointment, of certain con-
tract provisions, tenure credits, etc.) than a woman who may take a leave of absence; there-
fore the non-application of the maternity leave provision to men is unfair to men." Id.
127. Id. at 28.
128. The relevant portion of the former policy of the By-Laws of the Board of Higher
Education (supra note 122) was subsequently revised as follows:
Section 13.5 LEAVES FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES. . .c. Special leaves for the
purpose of caring for a newborn child shall be granted to a member of the in-
structional staff upon notification to the president and application for such
leave, provided the applicant has legal responsibility for the care and/or support
of said child. Such leave shall, insofar as is practicable, begin on February 1, or
September 1, unless the date of the birth of the child is such as to render these
times inappropriate . . . . Special leaves for the purpose of caring for a new-
born child shall be granted without pay during the period of the leave including
the vacation period concomitant to the leave.
Section 13.5(c), By-Laws of the Board of Higher Education, as amended.
129. 372 F. Supp. 274, aff'd, 387 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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nation, which he brought when he was denied a leave of absence
for child care. As in Danielson, the gender-based by-law was later
amended to provide parental leaves to all employees who were par-
ents, whether natural or adoptive, upon application.
13 0
The subsequent adoption of the gender-neutral policies con-
cerning child care leaves in these two cases reflects these employ-
ers' recognition of the previous discrimination in the policies. Fur-
thermore, society's attitudes concerning such policies are gradually
changing, so that more private 31 and public3 2 employers are
changing their policies to make child care leave privileges available
to both men and women.
Clearly, many changes will still have to be made before paren-
tal leaves are offered to and utilized by both men and women. The
changes will necessarily have to occur in the attitudes towards and
structure of both the family and professional worlds. In the family
itself, the responsibility of child care can be shared as equally as
possible by both parents,133 and this will necessitate a shift in
130. The amended section provided parental leave "to a natural or adoptive parent
upon application." Ackerman v. Board of Educ., 372 F. Supp. at 276. See supra notes 46-50
& accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Collins, Paternity Leave: A New Role for Fathers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7,
1981, at B18, col. 2, which states that one way to get men more involved in child care is by
establishing paternity-leave programs like those at the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, Procter & Gamble, CBS Inc., the Ford Foundation and the
Security Pacific Bank in California. The two-year-old program at New Jersey
Bell permits both women and men to take up to six months' "newborn child"
leave, without pay, and guarantees them a job of the same status and the same
salary upon their return.
Id. at col. 2-3.
132. See, e.g., Memorandum from Joseph A.F. Valenti, President, Civil Service Com-
mission to New York State Departments and Agencies (January 28, 1982), on the subject of
leave for pregnancy, childbirth and child care, which provides that "[e]mployees, regardless
of sex, are entitled to leave without pay for child care for up to seven months following the
date of delivery." Id. at 2.
133. See Rossi, A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, 106 DAEDALUS 1 (1977):
Infants may respond to anyone who provides stable loving caretaking, but the
predisposition to respond to the child may be much greater on the part of the
mother than the father, a reflection of the underlying dual orientation of the
female to both mate and child, a heritage that links mating and parenting more
closely for females than males, and one rooted in both mammalian physiology
and human culture. If a society wishes to create shared parental roles, it must
either accept the high probability that the mother-infant relationship will con-
tinue to have greater emotional depth than the father-infant relationship, or in-
stitutionalize the means for providing men with compensatory exposure and
training in infant and child care in order to close the gap produced by the phys-
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traditional sex-role behavior and attitudes, as well as much effort
by both spouses.134 Changes will also have to be made in the pre-
sent structure of the occupational world, which basically discour-
ages an interest in family life in favor of a total commitment to
work and success.135 A man's professional work is expected to take
precedence over his family life, and if he wishes to deviate from
that standard, he must face the reality that his superiors and peers
will neither share these values, nor support him in his endeavors. 1 3
In 'a study in which an accountant requested a month's leave of
absence to care for his three children, the researchers discovered
that employers were considerably less likely to approve the request
when made by a male, and more likely to interpret the request as
an indication of the male's unsuitability for employment with the
company.
13 7
iological experience of pregnancy, birth, and nursing.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
134. One husband and father realized from his personal experience that equality or
communality is not achieved once and for all, but must continually be striven for and
worked at. He desired to increse significantly his responsibilities in the home in order to
lessen his wife's burden. However, in relating his own degree of involvement, he admitted:
I assume no responsibility for major household tasks and family activities ....
True, I help in many ways and feel responsible for her having time to work at
her professional interests. But I do partial, limited things to free her to do her
work. I don't do the basic thinking about the planning of meals and housekeep-
ing, or the situation of the children. Sure, I will wash dishes and "spend time"
with the children; I will often do the shopping, cook, make beds, "share" the
burden of most household tasks; but that is not the same thing as direct and
primary responsibility for planning and managing a household and meeting the
day-to-day needs of children.
After critically examining his level of involvement, he realized that "[w]hat is needed is a
reconsideration of what is required in parenthood and in running a household .... Some
agreement on a minimum, satisfactory level of household care and some efficiency and shar-
ing in performing it are important for a couple." Miller, The Making of a Confused Middle-
Class Husband, 2 Soc. POL'Y, July-Aug. 1971, 33, 37, 38.
135. Bear, Berger & Wright, supra note 3, at 193-94.
136. Id. at 193-95. "[Mlen seeking to escape from the 'breadwinner' trap must deal with
the social reality that they are working for and with other men who are not concerned with,
or who reject the idea of, more egalitarian sex-role relationships." Id. at 194. See also Col-
lins, supra note 131, who relates that where one father was concerned, there was "a certain
amount of teasing with a sharp edge" from co-workers, and "unkind comments by mothers
in the pprk who saw Mr. Parisi taking care of the baby." Id. at col. 4, 5.
137. Bear, Berger & Wright, supra note 3, at 195. One article observed that law firms,
for example, are
dragging their feet when it comes to offering child-care benefits to men ....
[T]he "paternity leave" taken by most men doesn't exceed their vacation time,
and few men are active in seeking more liberal child-care policies at their law
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Even in company programs where such leaves are offered to
both male and female parents, far fewer men than women have
utilized the benefit."' 8 For example, the paternity-leave program
offered by the New Jersey Bell System has, since December 1981,
been utilized by only one male employee, who took a six-month
leave of absence to care for his newborn daughter.139 Another ex-
ample is found in Sweden's Parental Insurance Program, consid-
ered to be the most comprehensive government policy in the world,
which offered Swedish mothers and fathers nine months of paid
leave at 90% of their previous salary.140 The program has been uti-
lized by less than 10% of all the men who could have taken advan-
tage of the benefit; and of those, most used it for only a few days,
rather than for the full nine months.
4 1
CONCLUSION
It is evident that employers may not legitimately discriminate
between men and women in their distribution of parental leave
benefits. Title VII prohibits such discrimination in private employ-
ment, even under the bona fide occupational qualification excep-
tion, since caring for children does not depend upon any inherent
physical and cultural characteristics of either men or women. Fur-
thermore, under the Fourteenth Amendment, government employ-
ers may not make such distinctions between male and female par-
ents, since to do so would violate the principles of family and
parental autonomy 142 under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.
Before parental leaves are customarily offered by all employers
to all employees who are parents, attitudes and traditions will have
to change. The language and effect of all employment policies
should reflect this change by being made gender-neutral. In stat-
utes, by-laws, or policies referring to leaves of absence for child
firms. The result is that many firms have policies governing maternity leaves
only - which, when they exceed the period of physical disability, may give rise
to claims of sex discrimination.
Goldfarb, Make Room For Daddy, THn AMERICAN LAWYER, November 1980, at 53.
138. Collins, supra note 131, at col. 4-5.
139. Id. at col. 4.
140. Id. at col. 4-5.
141. Id. at col. 5.
142. See generally Keiter, supra note 89; Comment, supra note 84.
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care, any terminology referring to gender should be eliminated.
The term "parental leave" should be used whenever possible and
appropriate, replacing such classifications as "maternity leave" and
"paternity leave." Only then will legal equality in this area be as-
sured, and manifest sex-based discrimination in the distribution of
the benefits hopefully avoided.
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